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Beneficence: Need Ha¨yry Stand Politely By While
Savulescu and Herissone-Kelly Disagree?
PETER HERISSONE-KELLY
The Doctrine of the Plurality of Rationalities and
the Polite Bystander’s Perspective
The claim that the answers we give to many of the central questions in genethics
will depend crucially upon the particular rationality we adopt in addressing
them is central to Matti Ha¨yry’s thorough and admirably fair-minded book,
Rationality and the Genetic Challenge. That claim implies, of course, that there exists
a plurality of rationalities, or discrete styles of reasoning, that can be deployed
when considering concrete moral problems. This, indeed, is Ha¨yry’s position.
Although he believes that there are certain features definitive of any type of
thinking that can accurately be labeled rational,1 he maintains that nothing about
that set of features compels us to conclude that there is a single rationality. What is
more, and significantly for the way in which Ha¨yry’s book develops, there is no
Archimedean point from which we are licensed to pronounce one flavor of
rational deliberation to be intrinsically superior to any other or to be justified to
the exclusion of all others. To this belief that ‘‘there are many divergent
rationalities, all of which can be simultaneously valid,’’2 we can perhaps give
the name ‘‘the Doctrine of the Plurality of Rationalities’’ or, for short, ‘‘DPR.’’
Whether DPR ought to be accepted is, of course, a big question and one that is
far too weighty adequately to be tackled in a short article. Accordingly, in this
paper, I leave it to one side and instead address a much more parochial issue,
albeit one that is intimately connected with the claim made in DPR. To see what
that issue is, let us first suppose for the sake of argument that DPR is un-
controversially true. It would appear to follow from that doctrine, as Ha¨yry
concedes, that there is a somewhat reduced hope of fruitful dialogue between
positions on concrete bioethical problems wherever those positions are grounded
in disparate rationalities. And where each party in a bioethical disagreement
continues to insist on the universal applicability of her own style of rationality,
‘‘the result is a heated doctrinal shouting match camouflaged as a dispute
over what makes sense and what is reasonable.’’3 A largely quietistic, or as Ha¨yry
puts it ‘‘non-confrontational,’’ response to the existence of nonconvergent,
variegated rationalities and their differing conclusions might seem to be the
only sensible one.
This may be unfortunate to the extent that it stymies attempts to reach
definitive answers about what we ought to do in relation to a particular genetic
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technology. Nonetheless, it has the merit of being realistic: where no agreement
can, in principle, be reached, it is as well for us to acknowledge this. And Ha¨yry
is, at any rate, not entirely pessimistic when it comes to the possibility of common
ground and productive dialogue between rationalities. Such dialogue might, for
the most part, be beyond reach, but he would appear to think there will be
occasions on which at least some meaningful communication and progress can be
achieved. So, in characterizing what he calls his polite bystander’s perspective on
the particular genethical issues surveyed in the book (where the polite bystand-
er’s perspective is to be understood as a stance of ‘‘reflective equipoise’’ between
rationalities), Ha¨yry tells his readers, ‘‘I will not intentionally take sides in the
issues that I analyse, except in cases in which I think that a solution could be
accepted by all parties.’’4 In other words, it seems that we ought not to stand
politely by with respect to a bioethical debate until two conditions have been met:
(1) the participants in the debate are operating with different rationalities and (2)
there is no chance of their reaching, from within their differing rationalities,
a mutually acceptable solution.
Again assuming the truth of DPR, this seems to me to be eminently sensible. It
is methodologically sound, in the interests of achieving practical guidance on
genethical issues, to delay for as long as we can the moment when we admit the
in-principle futility of further debate. If DPR is correct, then much of the time we
will only be delaying the inevitable. But this may be preferable to our pre-
cipitately adopting the polite bystander’s perspective and wrongly declaring that
two or more entirely separate rationalities are, or need be, at work in a debate and
that no common ground is possible between them. This brings me onto the
central topic of my paper.
In Chapter 3 of his book, Ha¨yry examines two views, one advanced by Julian
Savulescu and the other by me, on the issue of whether a prospective parent has
a moral responsibility to select the child, from a range of her possible future
children, who is likely to lead the best life. More precisely, he takes my view (that
we have no such obligation) and Savulescu’s view (that we do have such an
obligation) to proceed from distinct rationalities, though he at least tentatively
suggests that the two views may be more compatible than they appear at first
sight. In the sections that follow, I argue first of all that the potential for a
rapprochement that Ha¨yry seems to detect in the two views is, in fact, not present.
I then go on to urge, significantly, that once this possible source of agreement is
gone, there is still no need to adopt a polite bystander’s view with respect to the
debate. If Savulescu and I were to abandon our discussion as soon as Ha¨yry’s
suggested rapprochement is seen to fail, we would be deserting it far too soon,
even if our positions really are rooted in separate rationalities.
Briefly, I maintain that this is so because there is implicit in my view a holism
about reasons for action that will arguably be a definitive feature of any system of
rationality and so also of the ‘‘mathematical rationality’’ distinctive of Savules-
cu’s work. Reason-holism is the doctrine that any consideration C that is able to
function as a reason for action will invariably be sensitive to the influence of other
considerations and background conditions that make up the context in which C
occurs. The important consequence of this is that, from the fact that a consider-
ation functions as a reason when it occurs in one context, it does not follow that it
will function as such a reason in every other context in which it occurs. What
operates as a reason to perform an -type act in situation S1, then, might not
Reasons, Rationalities, and Procreative Beneficence
259
operate as a reason to perform an -type act in situation S2, even in the absence of
any countervailing reasons being operative in S2. This is the picture of reason-
holism that Jonathan Dancy paints in his book Moral Reasons,5 and it is plausibly
a universal feature of reasons, even if DPR is true. If that is the case, then
Savulescu ought to accept it, and the debate remains open (though unresolved)
about whether what functions as a reason for choosing people who will have the
best lives in many contexts still operates as such a reason when the people doing
the choosing are prospective parents. I maintain that it does not. Savulescu will
doubtless persist in holding that it does. But so long as we both suppose that
reason-holism is true—which, again, even if Savulescu does not, he perhaps
should—meaningful dialogue can continue.
In the next section, in order to provide some necessary background, I briefly
sketch both Savulescu’s position and my opposing view. I am not concerned here
to argue for my own stance or against Savulescu’s.6 My sole aim in the current
paper is not to say which of the two views is right, but simply to show that, if we
embrace holism about reasons, we need not worry about whether the two
positions belong to separate rationalities. The debate between Savulescu’s view
and mine can remain live and even hold out the (admittedly distant) prospect of
a resolution. In short, I show that Ha¨yry would be being prematurely polite if he
were to suppose that the failure of his attempted rapprochement signals the end of
fruitful discussion between the two views.
The Principle of Procreative Beneficence and the Role of the Prospective Parent
In a landmark paper published in 2001, Julian Savulescu outlined and argued for
a moral principle that he labeled the principle of procreative beneficence. His
explanation of that principle has since become surely, and justifiably, one of the
most frequently quoted passages in the literature on reproductive ethics:
Couples (or single reproducers) should select the child, of the possible
children they could have, who is expected to have the best life, or at least
as good a life as the others, based on the relevant, available information.7
The thinking behind the principle is reasonably straightforward and intuitively
appealing. Suppose that a prospective parent is faced with a choice of two
embryos, A and B, and that A is likely to develop into a child with a better life
than the child who would develop from embryo B. Assuming, controversially,
that it could ever be possible reliably to make such judgments,8 it might seem
clear that we have a moral responsibility to choose A over B. If we have the
choice to bring into existence a better life or a worse life, then we ought to
produce the better life. To do so is to make the world a better place than it would
otherwise be, and this is something we should do wherever we can. If we flout
the principle of procreative beneficence and choose B over A, our choice will be
morally wrong.
We might, admittedly, disagree with this conclusion if we are persuaded by the
claim that if any act is to be wrong, it must be person affecting, or such as
negatively to affect some definite individual or group of individuals. After all,
choosing B over A, or the child who will have the worse life over the child who
will have the better life, does not negatively affect any particular individual. It
does not give B a worse life than she would otherwise have had, because if the
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choice had not been made, she would not have existed. Nor does it negatively
affect the child who would have developed from embryo A. That child has not
been denied a life: she does not exist to have her life denied her. To think
otherwise is to commit the mistake of supposing, as Jonathan Glover puts it, that
possible people not brought into existence are like would-be immigrants denied
entry to a country. But, as Glover urges, ‘‘the immigration queue model is
inappropriate here. People who are kept out by restricting immigration exist.
Those kept out of the world . . . are non-existent.’’9
However, it seems that there are good reasons not to be persuaded by the view
that all wrongs must be person affecting.10 Not least among those reasons is the
existence in the literature of a number of compelling thought experiments
detailing scenarios in which it seems counterintuitive to withhold the judgment
that morally wrong choices can be made, even though those choices will not
make any individual or set of individuals worse off than they would otherwise
have been.11
Perhaps the most direct way of displaying the central thought behind
Savulescu’s principle is by appeal to a point that he makes concerning reasons
for choice or action. Suppose that the child who would develop from A would be
free of all genetic abnormalities, whereas the child who would develop from B
would be predisposed to asthma. If this information is revealed to us through
genetic testing, we now have a reason to choose A over B, but no reason to choose
B over A.12 Because, according to Savulescu, morality requires us to do what we
have most reason to do,13 we are morally required to choose A.
In a 2006 paper responding to Savulescu’s article,14 I concede that there is, for
the most part, a responsibility to make choices that will result in the existence of
a person or set of persons with the best life or lives possible. I do not, therefore,
hold that all wrongs must be person affecting. Nonetheless, I argue (with
qualifications) that no such obligation exists when the decisionmaker is a pro-
spective parent deliberating about which out of a range of possible children to
bring into existence. This is because I believe that a prospective parent, just by
dint of her filling that role, has, for example, absolutely no reason to choose
embryo A over embryo B, provided that both A and B would develop into
children with lives worth living. There is something about the perspective
appropriate to a prospective parent that strips of their reason-giving force
considerations about which possible child will lead the best life. This perspective
I label ‘‘internal,’’ concerned as it is only with the future child’s estimation of his
or her own individual life; I contrast it with an external perspective that is
concerned to compare two or more possible lives from, so to speak, the outside
and to pronounce on which is best. When we adopt the internal perspective, the
sorts of reasons for choosing one child over another that show up from the
external perspective are nowhere to be seen. From the perspective most fitting for
the prospective parent, they simply do not exist.
There is no need for me to restate my arguments for this view here. The
important claim so far as the current paper is concerned is one that is implicit in
those arguments: it is possible for considerations that function as reasons for
action in one context (say, the making of public policies that will determine
whether people with better or worse lives will be born in the future) not to
function as such reasons in another context (when, for example, a prospective
parent is selecting her future child).
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Room for Agreement between Savulescu and Herissone-Kelly?
Ha¨yry’s Suggested Rapprochement
In the spirit of striving to find points of agreement between the proponents of
what he sees as distinct rationalities, Ha¨yry makes the suggestion that Savules-
cu’s view, once its finer points have been considered, is not as far from my own as
it might initially seem. He writes:
Interestingly, the two perspectives [internal and external] have natural
counterparts in Savulescu’s model. His notion of rationality is almost
inseparable from Herissone-Kelly’s external perspective; and the
concessions he makes to parental decision making when one’s own
child is in jeopardy seem to converge with Herissone-Kelly’s internal
considerations.15
It should be plain that Ha¨yry is right in claiming that Savulescu’s principle of
procreative beneficence embodies a judgment made from the external perspec-
tive. To assess Ha¨yry’s suggestion that there may be further agreement between
me and Savulescu, then, we need to get clear about the nature of the concessions
Savulescu makes to parental decisionmaking. That done, we can determine
whether they truly do converge with my ‘‘internal considerations.’’ I aim to show
that they do not. My doing so will set the stage for a brief explanation, in the next
section, of reason-holism and the manner in which my opposition to the principle
of procreative beneficence might be seen as relying upon it.
The first thing to note is that it is not unequivocally the case that Savulescu’s
concessions to parental decisionmaking entail that it would be morally acceptable
on occasion to select less than the best. So, for example, Savulescu maintains that
it is required of society that it allow parental autonomy. The upshot of this is
apparently that parents should not be legally obliged to choose the child likely to
lead the best life, even though they remain morally obliged to do so. In other
words, Savulescu’s claim here is not that a principle of reproductive autonomy
ever makes it morally permissible for parents to ignore the principle of pro-
creative beneficence. Rather, his view seems to be, to put it pithily, that society
has a moral obligation to permit prospective parents not to fulfill their moral
obligation to be guided by considerations of procreative beneficence.
On the other hand, Savulescu seems to suggest that a couple with dwarfism
who select a child with the same condition, on the grounds that their house is set
up for dwarfs, may be acting in a morally permissible way.16 If this is what
Savulescu is saying, then the thought is probably that the couple have most
reason to select a child with dwarfism (recall that for Savulescu, morality requires
us to do what we have most reason to do). Here, the reason to select the child
likely to have the best life is outweighed by a stronger reason. As Savulescu
writes, ‘‘Procreative Beneficence is a valid principle, albeit one which must be
balanced against others.’’17
But there is something noteworthy about this last claim that makes it
significantly different from the judgments that parents are likely to make from
the internal perspective. Savulescu’s talk about exceptions to the principle of
procreative beneficence is couched in terms of reasons being balanced against
each other and of a reason to select the child with the best life being outweighed
by other, more pressing reasons. However, in what we might call a pure
case—where there are no other principles in operation that carry greater weight
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than that of procreative beneficence—he maintains that we have a reason to
choose a better-life embryo A over a worse-life embryo B and no reason to choose
B over A. That being the case, we are morally required to choose A over B. Note
that the case of the couple with dwarfism is not a pure case: even assuming that
a child with dwarfism will be likely to lead a worse life than a child without
dwarfism (an assumption that, for the record, I do not share), the prospective
parents still have good reason to choose a child with the condition. That reason is
able to act as a counterbalance to the reason the parents have to select the child
likely to possess the best life.
My position is in stark and irreconcilable contrast to Savulescu’s view of pure
cases. I do not hold that the prospective parent has a reason to select A but an
equally strong reason to select B, thus rendering it a matter of indifference which
she chooses. Instead, I maintain that even in a pure case she has no reason at all to
select A over B and, for that matter, no reason at all to select B over A. It is the
absence of reasons on both sides, and not the presence of equally weighted
reasons on either side, that makes it the case that it does not matter morally
which embryo she chooses. So, even though Savulescu apparently agrees that
there can be occasions when the right thing to do is to choose a worse-life embryo
over a better-life embryo, he (a) does not think that this would ever be
a permissible thing to do in a pure case and (b) thinks that there is always
a reason for a prospective parent to choose the better-life embryo, even though
that reason might in impure cases be overridden by stronger reasons in favor of
the worse-life embryo. I disagree with him on both counts. So, I am able to say:
From the internal perspective [the perspective, recall, that is appropriate
to the prospective parent], the sort of transpersonal judgment needed to
ground [the principle of procreative beneficence] has no purchase: it
cannot be regarded as any sort of reason, let alone a moral one [emphasis
added].18
I suppose it would be possible, but mistaken nonetheless, to interpret me as
saying something subtly, but importantly, different to this and something that
would more nearly approximate the concessions that Savulescu makes. I might
be thought to be holding that, while there is a reason for choosing A over B in the
shape of A’s better prospects in life, this reason is overridden by a stronger reason
for not choosing either embryo in preference to the other. That stronger reason
might be characterized as the fact that the decision maker is a prospective parent,
and it is appropriate for prospective parents not to favor either potential child.
Although this position clearly has something in common with my view, it does
not accurately capture what I think about prospective parents’ reasons for action
or the lack thereof. According to my model, that someone is a prospective parent
is not a consideration that features in the deliberation that she ideally undergoes
when faced with a choice about which child to bring into existence. It is not,
therefore, a reason for action. Rather, it is an explanation of her inhabiting
a certain perspective, from which there is seen to be no reason to prefer A to B
or B to A. It is a position from which she deliberates, rather than a consideration
that enters into her deliberation. In addition, it is, I think, wrong to portray
the prospective parent as having a reason for not choosing one embryo over the
other. Instead, I want to say that she has no reason for choosing one over the
other. This distinction is a delicate one, but is of the highest significance.
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Because Ha¨yry’s attempt to find an overlap between my position and
Savulescu’s has, if I am right, turned out to be something of a cul-de-sac, are
we forced to conclude that the possibility of dialogue between the two view-
points is similarly doomed? Must we stand politely by and acknowledge that
each approach is sensible, but only by the standards of the particular rationality
from which it proceeds, and that it would be misguided for either one to try to
engage meaningfully with the other? I do not think so. I think instead that even if
we do consign each to a separate rationality—and, incidentally, I remain for the
purposes of this paper agnostic on the question of whether we should—there is
still the opportunity for fruitful debate between them. This is because, as I
mentioned earlier, I think that anything that can qualify as a rationality will be
subject to a holism about reasons, because I take it that all reasons for action are
subject to such holism. Any consideration that can function as a reason for action
is sensitive to the influence of other considerations and background conditions,
and those considerations and conditions determine whether it functions as
a reason here, in this particular context. And holism about reasons entails the
existence of a phenomenon that Jonathan Dancy and others call ‘‘silencing.’’ That
is, it is possible for a consideration that stands as a reason to perform -type
actions in one context to be no reason at all to perform such actions in another
context. In that other context, the consideration is silenced by the presence of
other conditions—it is rendered entirely inoperative as a reason, rather than
outweighed by a more powerful reason. Indeed, according to Dancy, the
consideration in question might in certain contexts function as a reason not to
perform -type actions or as a reason to perform -type actions instead, though
I am not, in this paper, directly concerned with these last two possibilities.
A Brief Account of Reason-Holism
My own view that a prospective parent has no reason to select a better-life
embryo over a worse-life embryo relies on the existence of a holism about reasons
and the attendant phenomenon of silencing. That is, I think that for the most
part—in most contexts—there exists good reason to take that course of action that
will result in the existence of better lives, even where those lives are not better for
any set of particular individuals. However, I think that the consideration that
usually functions as a reason in such cases is silenced when the person selecting
fills the role of prospective parent. The consideration that operates as a reason
elsewhere does not function in the same way here: it is silenced by facts about the
identity of the decisionmaker.
Savulescu is centrally concerned with rationality. If reason-holism, being
universally applicable to reasons for action, is a definitive feature of anything
that can qualify as a rationality, then it must be a feature of Savulescu’s rationality
too. In this section, I briefly set out the reasons for believing that reason-holism is
generally true.
In Moral Reasons, one of Dancy’s primary aims is to deny what he calls the
universalizability of reasons, understood as the view that what operates as
a reason here must likewise operate as a reason in all circumstances or even in all
relevantly similar circumstances. But the claim, as we have seen, is not simply
that reasons that are decisive in one context can be outweighed by more powerful
reasons in another context. Rather, it is that reasons that are decisive in one
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context can be silenced—have their status as reasons removed—by the consid-
erations and background conditions present in another context.
The intuitively compelling nature of this claim is, I think, powerfully brought
out by an example supplied by Dancy. He recalls hearing R.M. Hare claim that
cruel, pain-inflicting actions from which their perpetrators gain satisfaction have
at least this to be said for them: that they give pleasure to those who carry them
out.19 Hare’s thought seems to be that the pleasure to be gained from the
performance of such actions is some sort of consideration in favor of their being
performed, some sort of reason for executing them, albeit one that is massively
outweighed by the reasons against those acts (that they are cruel, that they cause
pain, and so on). Dancy, I think rightly so, finds this claim to be quite startlingly
wrong. He wants to maintain that, in the case of such acts, the fact that they give
pleasure to their perpetrators is no reason at all—not even an invariably
overridden reason—in their favor. Although the fact that an act will give pleasure
to the person who performs it is in many contexts a reason why that act should be
performed, in this sort of context, it is silenced by the presence of other
considerations that function as reasons against performing the act. Indeed, in
the case of cruel actions, the consideration that they give pleasure to their perpe-
trators plausibly functions as a further positive reason against their performance.
So, what frequently functions as a reason for an action here functions as a reason
against.
Now, the sort of silencing outlined in this example involves a consideration
that can function as a reason for action in some contexts, being silenced by other
considerations that function as reasons against action. But this, Dancy thinks,
need not be the only way in which silencing occurs. Considerations can also be
silenced by background conditions that do not themselves function as reasons, or
motivators. This is precisely, I submit, what happens when the person required to
choose which of two possible people to bring into existence, where one will be
likely to have a better life than the other, is the prospective parent of both. There
is not some further reason for action, peculiar to the context, that silences the
default obligation to bring into existence the person who will have the better life.
Rather, that default obligation is silenced by the background conditions of the
case, in the shape of the identity of the person called upon to do the selecting.
That embryo A will be likely to develop into a person with a better life than the
person who would develop from embryo B provides no reason at all for
a prospective parent to choose A over B. Nor is there any reason to select B
over A.
Again, I am not concerned here to rehearse the arguments for such silencing
occurring in the case of prospective parents faced with a choice between possible
children. I have supplied those elsewhere. I simply want to point out that my
stance, and my opposition to the principle of procreative beneficence, relies on
the existence of the phenomenon of silencing and to urge that the holism that
makes silencing possible is a universal feature of reasons for action.
Postponing the Adoption of the Polite Bystander’s Perspective
Once I have supplied a defense of my position that is rooted in reason-holism and
the possibility of silencing, Savulescu has open to him two potential responses to
it. First, he can deny reason-holism. If holism about reasons is unwarranted, then
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silencing cannot occur, and if silencing cannot occur, then the default reason in
favor of bringing into existence, from a range of possible people, those who are
likely to live the best lives will be operative. His second alternative would be to
admit that reason-holism is true and that silencing does sometimes take place,
but that it happens not to occur, as I argue it does, in the case of prospective
parents choosing their future children.
It seems to me that Savulescu would be ill advised to embrace the first
alternative. If the style of rationality employed by Savulescu is to be taken
seriously, it must be sensitive to the way in which reasons actually function in
everyday life. And, though I do not here have the space to argue for this claim in
any detail, I think that they do, in fact, display the sort of plasticity that Dancy
attributes to them. Indeed, in allowing a role, albeit a rather diminished one, to
general moral principles, Dancy makes a claim that might equally be used to
defend his own particularism:
It is the job of a philosopher, so far as possible, to give an account of our
practice rather than to tell us that we all ought to be doing something
else. To the extent that this cannot be done, it is normally a fault in the
philosophy rather than in the practice.20
I think there would be a fault in any philosophy that tried to deny the sensitivity
of reason to context and that tried to suggest that certain features of contexts are
not capable of silencing considerations that, elsewhere, operate as reasons. That,
it can be argued, is just not how reasons work.
Of course, this leaves open for Savulescu the second alternative: he can argue
that I am wrong in thinking the default consideration in favor of selecting people
with better lives is silenced when it is a prospective parent doing the selecting.
But note that, if he takes this approach, the debate is still live, and the possibility
of engagement in meaningful dialogue is still open. Although we may not
convince each other, he and I can each put forward our reasons and hope for
progress. Of course, if DPR is correct, it might turn out (1) that Savulescu and
I are working from within separate rationalities and (2) that those rationalities
preclude from the start our agreeing over whether or not silencing occurs where
I say it does. But whether both those conditions are met is not something that can
be decided in advance of our attempting the debate. Ha¨yry has no need to stand
politely by just yet.
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